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Abstract: It is a known result hat for a minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) game a Core allocation 
can be deduced irectly from a mcst in the underlying network. To determine this Core allocation 
one only needs to determine a mcst in the network and it is not necessary to calculate the coalition 
values of the corresponding mcst game. In this paper we will deduce other Core allocations directly 
from the network, without determining the corresponding mcst game itself: we use an idea of Bird 
(cf. [4]) to present two procedures that determine a part of the Core (called the Irreducible Core) 
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1 Introduction 
A mcst game is a cooperat ive cost game that arises from a cost al location 
problem in a complete weighted graph. One node of this graph represents a
source that can provide the other nodes (which are identified with the players) 
with a certain good or service. The value of a coalit ion in the mcst game is 
determined by the minimal cost to provide the members of that coal it ion with 
the good or service involved, without help from the players outside the coalit ion, 
i.e., the minimal  cost to connect all players in the coal it ion to the source (directly 
or via other players in that coalition). This minimal  cost is precisely the cost of 
a mcst in the weighted subgraph induced by the coal it ion involved. Mcst games 
were introduced by Bird [4]. Throughout  his paper we will use the  following 
notat ions and definitions concerning mcst games. 
For  n ~ I~l put N := { 1, 2, . . . ,  n} and for S ~_ N put So := S w {0}. 
Definition I.I: A network on N O is an ordered pair (KNo, w), where KNo := 
(No, E(KNo) ~ represents he complete graph with node set N O and set of undirected 
edoes E* KNo):= { {i,j}[i,j ~ No, i ~ j}, and w: E(KNo)~ •+ represents a non- 
negative function on E(KNo ). 
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The nodes in N are interpreted as the users in the network and node 0 as the 
common supplier. The function w is called the weight function of the network. Let 
2 N denote the power set of N, i.e., 2 N := {S[S ~_ N}. 
Definition 1.2: Let ( KNo, w) be a network on No and S e 2N\{~}. The subnetwork 
of (KNo , w) on So is the ordered pair (Kso, w), where Kso := (So, E(Kso)) 
represents the complete graph with node set S O and edge set E(Kso) :-- {{i, j} l i, 
j fSo ,  i r  
Note that the restriction of the weight function w to the edge set E(Kso ) is also 
denoted by w. 
Definition 1.3: 7he minimum cost spanning tree (mest) game corresponding to the 
network (KNo, w) is the cooperative cost game in characteristic function form 
(N, c), where the characteristic function c: 2 N ~ ~ is given by 
c(;g) := o 
and for all S e 2N\{~} 
c(S) := total weight of a mcst Fso = (So, E(Fso)) in the subnetwork (Kso, w), 
i.e., 
c(S) :-- 2 {w(e)le  E(Fso)} 9 
In the game theoretic ontext, elements of N are called players. Mcst games 
were also studied in Granot and Huberman [7], [8], [9], Aarts [1] and Aarts 
and Driessen [2], [3]. In these papers special attention is paid to the Core of 
mcst games. The Core C(c) of a cooperative cost game (N, c) is the set of all 
allocations of the joint cost c(N) that have the property that no coalition would 
be better off if it would separate and pay its cost in the game, so 
C(c) := {x e ~"]x(N) = c(N) and x(S) < c(S) for all S e 2 N} . 
Here the i-th coordinate of x e R" represents he charge to player i according to 
the allocation x. For any x e N" and S e 2 N, we write x(S) instead o f~ {xiJi ~ S}, 
where x (~)  = 0. Granot and Huberman [7] showed that mcst games possess a
nonempty Core and their proof is based on the construction of one specific Core 
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allocation. This allocation can be derived irectly from a mcst FNo in the underly- 
ing network as follows: each player i is charged the weight of the unique edge, 
incident with node i, that is on the path in FNo from node i to the common 
supplier 0. We will denote this so-called mcst allocation corresponding to the 
mcst FNo by T(FNo). 
Summarizing, for mcst games a Core allocation can be determined irectly 
from (a mcst in) the network, i.e., it is not necessary to determine the coalition 
values of the corresponding mcst game (using Definition 1.3) in order to deter- 
mine this particular Core allocation. A lot of efforts have been made to find Core 
allocations, other than mcst allocations, that can also be deduced irectly from 
the network (without first determining the mcst game itself). In case the network 
contains a mcst which is a chain (i.e., a spanning tree in which all nodes have 
degree two, except for the common supplier and one other node which have 
degree one), lots of additional Core allocations can be determined in this way (cf. 
[3], I-1]). For an arbitrary network, however, the only known result is Granot 
and Huberman's (repeated) weak demand operation (cf. [9]). This operation 
transforms a mcst allocation into another allocation using the idea that, if 
allocated according to a mcst allocation, a player i can charge his followers (in 
the mcst considered) some amount for using (in order to connect hemselves to 
the common supplier) the edge that connects i to his predecessor. (According to 
the mcst allocation the cost of this edge is fully charged to i himself!) In I-4] 
another idea is presented to obtain Core allocations from the network. In 1-4] a 
new weight function is constructed with the aid of a fixed mcst in the network 
considered. The Core of the mcst game corresponding tothe new network, called 
the Irreducible Core, is a subset of the original Core. The main goal in this 
paper is to show how (the extreme points of) this Irreducible Core can be 
deduced from the network without first having to determine the mcst game itself. 
In 1-4] and 1-6] two nice characterizations for the Irreducible Core are 
presented: the set of extreme points of the Irreducible Core coincides with both 
the set of marginal allocations of the mcst game corresponding to the adapted 
network and the set of all mcst allocations in this adapted network. We will use 
these characterizations to present wo procedures to determine the extreme 
points of the Irreducible Core from this network. The first procedure determines 
all marginal allocations directly from this network and the second etermines all 
mcst allocations. 
In the next section we will present an accurate definition of the notion of 
Irreducible Core and state the main known results. Then we use these results 
to describe the two procedures to determine this Irreducible Core from the 
adapted network. In the last section we elucidate one of these procedures with 
an example. 
We conclude this section with some notations and state a graph theoretic 
theorem. The proof of this theorem can be found in [3]. 
An arbitrary graph G will be denoted by the ordered pair (V(G), E(G)), where 
V(G) represents he node (vertex) set and E(G) the (undirected) edge set of G. If 
there can be no ambiguity we write V and E instead of V(G) and E(G) respec- 
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tively. A (non-negative) weighted graph G will be denoted by the ordered triple 
(V(G), E(G), w), where w: E(G)~ ff~+ represents a non-negative weight func- 
tion. Let /-'= (V(G), E(F)) be a spanning tree in a connected graph G = 
(V(G), E(G)). For any i,j ~ V(G), we denote the unique path in F from i to j  (or 
vice versa) by Pgj(F):= (V(Pij(F)), E(Pi~(F))). Similarly, for any e e E(G) we 
denote the unique path in F from one end point of e to the other by Pe(F) := 
(V(P~(F)), E(Pe(F)) ). In particular, P~(F) = Pij(F) whenever e = {i,j} ~ E(G). 
Theorem 1.4: The following statements for a spanning tree F = (V, E(F)) in a 
fixed weighted connected graph ( V, E, w) are equivalent. 
i) F is a mcst in ( V, E, w) 
ii) w(e) > w(e') for all e e E\E(F) and e' e E(Pe(F) ). 
2 The Irreducible Core 
In this section we define an adaptation of the weight function in a network. This 
adaptation was introduced in I-4] to determine additional Core allocations for 
mcst games. We will mention some interesting properties of the resulting net- 
work and its corresponding mcst game. We will define the notion of Irreducible 
Core and present two procedures to determine the extreme points of this subset 
of the original Core directly from the adapted network. 
Definition 2.1: Let ['No be a mcst in (KNo, w). Define the network (KNo, wr~o ) by 
wr~o(e) := max{w(~)[~ E E(Pe(FNo)) } for all e e E(KNo) . 
For any edge e ~ E(KNo) the new weight w r~o(e) represents he largest weight of 
all edges that are on the path in FNo from one endpoint of e to the other. The 
next proposition states ome elementary properties of the network (KNo, w rNo). 
Proposition 2.2: 
i) wrNo(e) = w(e) for all e ~ E(FNo) 
ii) wrNo(e) < w(e) for all e ~ E(KNo ) 
iii) FNo is a mcst in (KNo, wCNo) 
iv) I f  F/Vo is a mcst in (KNo, w), then F~o is also a mcst in (KNo, wrNo) and 
wrNo(e) = wr~o(e) for all e ~ E(KNo ). 
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Proof: 
i) follows directly from Definition 2.1 since Pe(FNo) = {e} for all e e E(FNo ). 
ii) is a consequence of Theorem 1.4 applied to the mcst FNo in (KNo, w). 
iii) follows from (i), Definition 2.1 and Theorem 1.4. 
iv) Let F~o be a mcst in (KNo, w). Then 
{wr~o(e)le ~E(F~o) } <_ ~ {w(e)le ~ E(F~o) } 
= ~ {w(e)le ~ E(FNo)} = ~ {wr~o(e)le ~E(FNo)} , 
where the inequality follows from (ii), the first equality from the fact that both 
FNo and F~o are mcst's in <K~o, w> and the last equality from (i). So F~o is a 
spanning tree in <KNo, wry~ with less total weight than the mcst FNo (cf. (iii)). 
Therefore F~o is also a mcst in <KNo, wry~ This implies that the inequality 
above must be an equality. So, by (ii), w r~o(e) = w(e) for all e e E(F~o ). This yields 
wr~o(e) = (wrNo)r~o(e)< wr~o(e) for all e e E(KNo), where the equality follows 
from Definition 2.1 applied to the mcst F~o in the networks <KNo, w> and 
(KNo, wr~o> respectively and the fact that wrNo(e)= w(e) for all e eE(F~o), 
whereas the inequality follows from (ii) applied to the mcst F~o in the net- 
work <KNo, wrN~ Exchanging the roles of FNo and F~o we obtain in a similar 
way wrNo(e)< wr~o(e) for all e~E(KNo). Therefore wr~o(e)= wr~o(e) for all 
e e E(KNo). [] 
The statements (i)-(iii) together with Theorem 1.4 imply that w CNo is the smallest 
weight function among weight functions of networks that contain FNo as a mcst 
and whose weight functions coincide with w on E(FNo). Part (iv) states that the 
weight function w rNo does not depend upon the choice of the mcst FNo. This 
justifies the notation ~ instead of w rNo. 
Now let (N, ~) denote the mcst game corresponding to the network (KNo, ~). 
The following results and their proofs can be found in [4] and I-6]. 
Theorem 2.3: 
i) (N, ?) is a concave game, i.e., 
~(S u {i}) - ~(S) _> ~(Tu {i}) - ~(T) for all i~ N and all S ~_ T ~_ N\{i} 
ii) C(0 = ch{T(FNo)]FN o is a mcst in (KNo, w)}, 
where, for any set Q _ R ~, ch(Q) denotes the convex hull of Q. Part (i), which is 
proved in [6], implies that the Core of (N, E) is exactly the convex hull of all 
marginal allocations of (N, ~) (cf. 1-12]). Here the notion of a marginal alloca- 
tion is defined as follows. 
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Definition 2.4: Let (N, c) be an arbitrary cost game and 0 a permutation of the 
player set N. The marginal allocation m~ ~ R" of ( N, c) corresponding to 0 is 
given by 
m~ := c(P ~ w {i}) -- c(P ~ for all i ~ N 
where Pi ~ := {j ~ NIO(j) < 0(i)} represents the set of players who precede player 
i in the O-order. 
In [4], the Core of (N, ~) is called the Irreducible Core of (N, c). From Proposi- 
tion 2.2 (i)-(iii) it follows that ~(N) = c(N) and ~(S) < c(S) for all S ~ 2 N. There- 
fore the Irreducible Core of (N, c) is a subset of C(c). Granot and Huberman's 
proof of part (ii) of Theorem 2.3 in [6] shows that for each marginal allocation 
of (N, ~) there exists a mcst FNo in (KNo, ~) whose corresponding mcst alloca- 
tion is exactly this marginal allocation. 
On basis of the results of Theorem 2.3 we mention two ways to determine the 
Irreducible Core (and therefore a part of the original Core). Both ways can be 
used without first determining the mcst games (N, c) and (N, ?). 
The first way determines all marginal allocations of (N, ~) (i.e., the extreme 
points of the Irreducible Core) directly from the network. This way uses the 
following property of (KNo, ~). Each mcst Fso in any subnetwork (Kso, ~) can 
be extended to a mcst in the subnetwork (K~s~lil~o, ~) simply by adding node 
i to FSo with the aid of one specific edge (i ~ N\S). This property is a consequence 
of the proof of Lemma 8 in [6]. Therefore ach marginal allocation m~ of 
(N, ~) can be determined by constructing a mcst Fno in (KNo, ~) starting 
with node 0 and adding all other nodes, one by one, in the order described 
by 0. The marginal contribution rag(0(? ) of a player O(i) then corresponds 
to the weight of an edge with minimal weight that connects node O(i) to the 
mcst on node set {0(1) . . . . .  O(i - 1)} w {0}. This contribution therefore quals 
the minimal weight of an edge connecting node O(i) with one of the nodes in 
{0(1) . . . . .  O(i -- 1)} w {0}. 
The second method to determine the Irreducible Core doesn't consider mar- 
ginal allocations but uses the result of Theorem 2.3(ii) directly. This method 
determines all mcst's in (KNo, ~) and deduces their mcst allocations. To apply 
this method one must know how to find all mcst's in (KNo, ~). First we formu- 
late one of Kruskal's procedures (cf. [10]) to construct a mcst in a 
weighted connected graph. 
The following procedure generates a mcst in the weighted connected graph 
(V, E, w). (2.1) 
- -  Choose any node v ~ V. Put S = {v} and/~ = ~.  
- -  As long as S ~ V, choose an edge {i,j} ~ E with i 6 S andj  ~ V\S such that 
w({i,j}) = min{w({k, l})[k ~ S, l ~ V\S, {k, l} ~ E}. 
Put S:= Su  {j} and/~:= Eu  {{i,j}}. 
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This procedure constructs a mcst in (V, E, w) starting with an arbitrary node v, 
i.e., a one-node-tree, and extends this tree, step by step, by adding one node at 
the time, each time using one of the available dges of lowest weight. The next 
Theorem states that each mcst in a weighted connected graph is obtainable from 
procedure (2.1), where the starting point can be chosen arbitrarily. 
Theorem 2.5: Let F= (V, E(F)) be a mcst in the weighted connected graph 
(V, E, w). Then F can be constructed by procedure (2.1), starting at any node 
v~V. 
Proof: Assume the contrary. Take v ~ V such that F cannot be constructed by 
starting the procedure (2.1) at v. We construct F, starting at v as far as possible 
using procedure (2.1). This will end up with a connected graph Fs = (S, if2) with 
v ~ S ~ V and/~ ~ E(F). Take {i,j} ~ E such that i ~ S,j E V\S and w({i,j}) = 
min{w({k, l})lk ~ S, l ~ V\S, {k, l} ~ E}. Then 
w({i,j}) < min{w({k, /})lk ~ S, l E V\S, {k, l} ~ E(F)} (2.2) 
because the procedure (2.1) terminated at stage (S,/~). Take {i*,j*} ~ E(Pii(F)) 
with i* e S and j* e V\S. Then w({i*,j*}) > w({i,j}) because of (2.2). But then 
(V, (E(F)u {{i, j}})\{{i*,j*}}) would be a spanning tree in (V, E, w) with 
less total weight than F. This contradiction completes the proof of the 
theorem. [] 
Theorem 2.5 guarantees that all mcst's in a network can be determined by 
performing the procedure (2.1) in all possible ways (starting with a fixed chosen 
node). Now the extreme points of the Irreducible Core can be obtained simply 
by deducing from each mcst in (KNo, ~) its mcst allocation (cf. Theorem 2.3(ii)). 
The two procedures described above show that several Core allocations of a 
mcst game other than mcst allocations can be obtained irectly from the net- 
work. In the next section we will elucidate the determination of the weight 
function ~ and the extreme points of the Irreducible Core (using the second 
procedure) for a special class of mcst games. 
3 An Example 
In [5] relationships between mcst games and bankruptcy games are studied. In 
this context 0 < dl < d2 _< "'" _< dn denotes the sequence of claims of creditors 
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1, 2 . . . . .  n respectively in a bankruptcy situation with estate E. We assume that 
0 < E < d(N) where, for S ~_ N, d(S) := ~ di (otherwise the bankruptcy prob- 
i eS  
lem would not exist). Further, D := d(N) - E denotes the part of the claims that 
cannot be met by the estate. The bankruptcy game <N, u> corresponding to 
this bankruptcy situation is defined as 
u(S) := max{O, E - d(N\S)} for all S ___ N (cf. [11]) . 
In [5] necessary and sufficient conditions on the estate and the claims are given 
to assure that the zero-normalization f a bankruptcy game <N, u> can be 
represented as the cost savings game arising from a mcst game <N, c>, which 
means that the relationship 
u(S)- ~ u({i})= ~c({i})- c(S) 
iES i t s  
for all S __c N (3.1) 
holds. This representation is possible if and only if either 0 < D < da or there 
exists a k 9 {3, 4 . . . . .  n - 1} such that dk < D < dk+ 1 and d(K) < D (where K := 
{1, 2 . . . . .  k}). It is shown in [5] that under these conditions the mcst game 
(N, c> involved corresponds tothe network <KNo, w> where, for {i,j} 9 E(KNo), 
w({i, j}) is defined by 
w({i, j}) := |2D - di 
L 20 -- max{O,d i + d 1 -  D} 
i f i=O, j  9  
if D < d i < dj 
if di < D < dj 
i fd~<dj<D . 
So in particular, c({i}) = w({0, i}) = 2D for all i 9 N and hence, relationship 
(3.1) reduces to 
c(S) = 2[SID + ~ u({ i} ) -  u(S) = 2ISID + ~ max{O, E -  d(N\{ i})} 
ieS i eS  
- max{O, E - d(N\S)} = 2[SID - ~ rain{O, D - d,} 
i eS  
+ rain{O, D -- d(S)} 
= 2[SID + min{d(S), D} - ~. min{d,, D} 
i t s  
for all S _ N . (3.2) 
It is a known result that bankruptcy games are convex games, i.e., 
u(S w {i}) -- u(S) <_ u(T w {i}) -- u(T) for a l l iENanda l lS~_T~_N\{ i}  .
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So, by (3.1), the mcst game (N, c) corresponding to the network (KNo, w) is 
concave. This class of mcst games is one of the few known classes of concave 
mcst games. For these games (in contradistinction with arbitrary mcst games) 
we can easily determine the Core, because for concave cost games the Core 
coincides with the convex hull of the set of all marginal allocations (cf. I-12]). This 
and Theorem 2.3(i) encouraged us to determine the Irreducible Core of these 
games in order to investigate (in future research) how the Irreducible Core of a 
mcst game is related to its Core in case the mcst game is already concave itself. 
This explains why we use this particular network to elucidate the second method 
described in the previous ection to determine the extreme points of the Irreduc- 
ible Core. 
Before determining the network (KNo, ~)  we show how to determine all mcst 
allocations in the network (KNo, w) itself. In this section we will focus on the 
case that there exists a k e {3, 4 . . . . .  n - 1} such that dk < D < dk+~ and d(K) <<_ 
D. So d~ < D for all i e K and d~ > D for all i ~ N\K. First note that 
2D-max{O,d i+d j -D}>2D-d i>D for alli, j~K  . (3.3) 
We divide K into classes of players with equal demands. Let dl < d2 < "'" <dt  
be such that {dl, 22 . . . .  ,2,} = {d 1, d 2 . . . . .  dk}, where t < k = IKI and let for 
i = 1, 2 . . . . .  t respectively, K i := {j ~ Kld~ = 2,} denote the set of all players in 
K with claim equal to 2~. Note that the players in K* have consecutive numbers. 
Now by Theorem 2.5 and (3.3) we have that each mcst in (KNo, w) can be 
constructed as follows. 
Start with any node v ~ N\K  (note that N\K  ~ ~j because n~ N\K). Then 
connect all other nodes in N\K  in an arbitrary order, each by using an edge of 
weight D. This results in a spanning tree T on node set N\K. Subsequently the 
nodes in K t are connected with T in an arbitrary order, i.e., each node in K t is 
connected with some node in N\K, using an edge of weight 2D - dr. Then the 
nodes in K t-1 are connected with T in an arbitrary order, i.e., each node in K t-1 
is connected with some node in N\K, using an edge of weight 2D - 2t-~. Then 
the nodes in K t-2 are connected with T and so on, up to the nodes in K 1. Finally 
0 is connected with an arbitrary node in N by an edge of weight 2D. 
Knowing that each mcst in (KNo, w) can be constructed as indicated above, 
we now are able to describe all mcst allocations of (N, c). If we distinguish two 
cases concerning the unique neighbour j of 0 in the mcst FNo considered, we can 
derive the following expressions. 
Case l: j E N\K. Then 
i f i~ K 
ifi = j  
otherwise . 
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Case 2: j ~ K. Let /j e N\K denote the unique node with {j, it} e E(FNo ) (cf. 
construction method of FNo described above). Then 
f 22~ - di D 
Ti(FN~ = dj 
if i s K\{j} 
if i = j  
ifi = ij 
otherwise .
Concerning the calculations of the marginal allocations of the mcst game 
(N, c) of (3.2), we remark the essential property that any coalition S _c N with 
ISI _> 2 satisfies d(S) < D if and only ifS _ K. Moreover, by (3.2), the equality 
c(S w {i}) - c(S) = 2D + min{d(S w {i}), D} - min{d,, D} - min{d(S), D} 
holds for each i e N and each S c_ N\{i}. Now it is straightforward to verify that 
f 
2D 
m~ = 20  - ~ 
2D min{di, D} 
if i e Pj~ 
if i = Jo 
otherwise , 
where, for any permutation 0 ofN,jo ~ N\K  satisfies O(jo) <_ O(1) for a l l /e  N\K. 
Notice that, i f j  e N\K, T(FNo) coincides with the marginal allocation m~ 
corresponding toany permutation 0 of N satisfying O(j) = 1. Ifj e K then T(FNo) 
coincides with the marginal allocation m~ corresponding to any permutation 
0 of N satisfying O(j) = 1 and O(ii) = 2. 
Determining the weight function W can easily be done using Definition 2.1 
applied to the mcst (No, {{0, n}} w {{i - 1, i}[i = k + 2 ..... n} w {{i, k + 1}1 
i e K} ). The result of such an exercise is 
~({i,j}) := I~  D 
~. 2D -- dl 
i f /=  0,j ~ N 
if D <_ di < dj 
if di< D <_ dj or d~ _< dj < D . 
By Theorem 2.5 and 2D > 2D - d~ > D for all i e K we have that each mcst in 
(KNo, ~)  can be constructed as follows. 
Start with any node v ~ N\K. Then connect all other nodes in N\K in an 
arbitrary order, each by using an edge of weight D. Subsequently, connect all 
nodes in K t, one by one, in an arbitrary order, using an edge of weight 2D -- dt 
(so the first node of K t (in the chosen order) is connected with some node in N\K, 
the others with either a node in N\K or a node in K t which is already connected). 
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Then connect all nodes in K" ,  one by one, in an arbitrary order, using an edge 
of weight 2D - d .  (so the first node of K"  (in the chosen order) is connected 
with some node in (N\K)  w K', the others with either a node in (N\K)  u K t or a 
node in K"  which is already connected). Then the nodes in W -z are connected 
and so on, up to the nodes in K 1. Finally 0 is connected to an arbitrary node in 
N by an edge of weight 2D. 
Knowing the structure of the mcst's in <K~o, W>, we now can describe all mcst 
allocations of <N, ~>. Let again j ~ N denote the unique neighbour of 0 in the 
mcst F~o considered. 
Case l : j  ~ N\K .  Now the structure of FNo directly implies that 
i f i~K  
i f /= j  
otherwise .
Case 2:j ~ K, sayj  ~ K i (i ~ {1 . . . . .  t}). Consider the (unique) path in FNo f romj  
to some node u in N\K .  Put 11 := j and let { Jl, 12 }, { J2, 13 } . . . . .  { jp, lp+ 1 } denote 
the edges in E(Pj,,(FSo)) that satisfy Jr ~ K~r and I r E K ~r for all 1 _< r _< p and 
lp+l ~ N\K ,  where i = i I < i 2 < ' "  < ip__ t (the edges {j l , /2}, {J2,/3}, . . . ,  
{jp,/p+l} denote those edges on the path Pju(FNo) that connect nodes corre- 
sponding to players with different claims. Put, for 1 _< r <_ p, L ~r := K ~ n 
V(Pi#(FNo)) (cf. Figure 3.1)). Now we can deduce immediately that Tj(FNo) = 2D 
and, for 1 < r < p, T~+~(FNo ) = 2D - d~. = 2D - dj. If i ~ N\ (K  u {Ip+l}) then 
E(P..~,(FNo)) n E(Pl~.~o(Fuo)) = ~ because V(P.~+~(FNo)) ~-- N \K  (cf. construc- 
tion of FNo described above) and therefore we deduce from E(P~o(FNo))= 
E(P.~,(FNo)) u E(P~ § that T/(FNo) = D. Now it remains to consider the 
case i ~ K\{ l l  . . . . .  1;}. I f /e  g(Pop(rNo))\{ll . . . . .  lp}, say i e L '" for some 1 _< r _< 
p, then T~(FNo) = 2D - d~r = 2D - d~. If i ~ KkV(Pj#(FNo)) then the inclusion 
E(Pio(FNo)) c_ E(p~.(FNo)) w E(P..(FNo)) u E(P.o(FNo)) (the edge set of the path 
2D @-----_ 
0 ! 
! 
I 
I 
I 
i 
5_ 
s 
L 1 i 2 L 
Fig. 3.1. Sketch of  Pot,(FNo) 
)3 
I 
I 
I 
I z 
3, 
i 3 
L 
2~-~ 
ip-1 
1 
! 
I '[ ! I 
p U 
i- (N/KhV(Pju(~NO) ) 
L p 
174 H. Aarts and T. Driessen 
from i to 0 is contained in the edge set of any walk from i to 0) together with 
V(Pou(FNo)) ~ N\K (cf. construction of FNo described above) imply that the edge 
in E(Pio(Fso)) incident with i coincides with the edge in E(Piv(FNo)) incident with 
i. Therefore, by the construction of FNo, T~(_FNo ) = 2D - d~. Summarizing, 
 (rNo) = - dj ,  
L 2D di 
i f /= j  
i f i= l r+ 1 ,1<r<p 
i f /~  N\(K w (lp+l}) 
otherwise .
Now the Irreducible Core can be obtained immediately from Theorem 2.3(ii). 
Notice that the set of mcst allocations of (N,  c) is indeed a subset of the set of 
mcst allocations of (N, 5). In case t >_ 2 this inclusion is strict, which means that 
in this case several Core allocations of (N, c), other than mcst allocations of 
(N,  c), are determined. 
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